ABSTRACT. This note analyzes the judgment delivered by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the case of Brewer Carías v. Venezuela. It argues that the criteria that allowed the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies contravenes the precedents of the Inter-American line of case law. By examining the origin and implications of the newly-introduced concept of an "early stage" in domestic proceedings, this note then reaches to the conclusion that it could endanger the accessibility and impact of the InterAmerican Human Rights System. KEY WORDS: Exhaustion of domestic remedies, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, preliminary objection, early stage.
PALABRAS CLAVE. Agotamiento de recursos internos, Corte Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, excepción preliminar, etapa temprana. (hereinafter referred to as the case of Brewer). This decision allowed a preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies based on unprecedented criteria.
This note analyses the aforesaid judgment and sustains that the standards contained therein establish a judicial precedent that could affect the accessibility and impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System (hereinafter referred to as IAHRS). This work has been divided into four sections: the first one briefs the facts and the decision delivered in the Case of Brewer; the second section elucidates about the generalities concerning the procedural exigency to exhaust domestic remedies; the third part explains how this requisite has been applied by the IAHRS, in order to describe the changes that were introduced through the Case of Brewer particularly regarding the concept of an "early stage" in domestic proceedings; the last section exposes the consequences of these changes, and proposes a way for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the IACHR) to counter its negative effects. Chávez. Professor Brewer was suspected to have taken part in drafting the Carmona Decree, which was the document establishing a transitory government after the temporary suspension of Chávez's authority.
I. THE CASE OF BREWER IN BRIEF
Starting from 2002, various provisory prosecutors conducted the criminal investigation against Professor Brewer. The first appointed prosecutor did not file any accusation and neither did the second; as a consequence they were both removed and one of them was even killed. Subsequently, the third appointed prosecutor finally accused Professor Brewer of committing conspiracy against the government.
The case was then brought before a provisory criminal judge who was substituted after having delivered a restriction order that was revoked by the Court of Appeals. The second judge was also suspended on his functions and a third provisory judge was appointed to subpoena the parties to the public hearing in which the court had to deliver a decision on the admissibility of the accusation.
After the prosecutor filed the accusation and while a third provisory judge conducted the first stage of the criminal process, Mr. Brewer moved to the city of New York in order to assume a position as Professor of the University of Columbia. Subsequently, the judge issues a detention order against Prof. Brewer in 2006, whose execution remains pending after a couple of failed extraditing attempts. Up to this moment, as the detention order remains valid, Professor Brewer would be incarcerated if he returns to Venezuela.
Brewer's absence from Venezuela has kept him from being detained, however it has also caused an indefinite suspension of his criminal trial, as the domestic law does not allows an accused person to be judged in absentia.
Consequently, in order to raise Professor Brewer's claims before the domestic courts and as a mean for terminating the criminal accusation without having to suffer from a detention, the defendant's attorney requested a declaration of nullity against the criminal proceedings as a whole. Nevertheless, in spite of the defendant's arguments, the court deemed that such a request for annulment had to be decided during the public hearing in which Professor Brewer's attendance was necessary.
At present, both the criminal trial and the request for the declaration of nullity are still suspended and awaiting that Professor Brewer returns to Venezuela in order to attend the public hearing, which would also imply that he presents himself to be detained and 170 incarcerated. Therefore, as the Venezuelan law does not provide any other mean for legal redress, Professor Brewer considered that his case was suitable to be presented before the IACHR.
The petition was filed on January 24, 2007 and claimed that the provisory character of the prosecutors and judges deprived Professor Brewer of his judicial guarantee to an impartial trial, as those officials were always subject to the authority of their hierarchical superiors' political interests. It also denounced several irregularities that presumably affected his rights of defense and judicial protection.
Regarding the admissibility requirements, the petitioner contended that he ought to be exempted from exhausting domestic remedies in accordance to Article 46.2 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ACHR) because:
a) The domestic law does not affords due process of law for the protection of his rights as the structural deficiencies in the Venezuelan justice system establish a provisory character to prosecutors and judges. b) He has been denied access to remedies under domestic law, as he was arbitrarily prevented from exhausting the request for annulment by conditioning its processing to the appearance of the defendant before the court, although that would mean he would be subject to detention. c) There had been an unwarranted delay in the processing of his request for annulment, as more than 3 years had passed since it was filed without it been decided.
II. A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION

OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies (hereinafter referred to as "the rule of exhaustion") is a principle of International Law that reaffirms the subsidiary and complementary character of international organizations. This general principle was incorporated as a procedural rule of the mechanisms implemented by the international human rights law, 4 since then, it has developed a particular content to provide States with the opportunity to remedy any given violation to a human right committed by its' officials without suffering international intervention.
Practically every international organization with competence to process individual petitions regarding human rights issues has recognized that the rule of exhaustion refers only to available and effective means of legal redress, 5 that is to include only those remedies that are able to rectify the grievances and are capable of producing the result for which they were conceived. 6 However, in spite of this consensus, various international organizations have shaped some criteria about the rule of exhaustion in a different manner. It is relevant for this note to distinguish nuances in the flexibility with which this rule is applied. For instance, whereas the I/A Court H.R. has considered that the only remedies that need to be exhausted are those that existed at the moment of any given violation, 7 the European Court on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ECHR) has dismissed petitions for the non-exhaustion of remedies that were created after a violation occurred, as long as they were accessible to the petitioner by the moment when the petition was filed. flexibility of the rule of exhaustion, while the ECHR is limited by its necessity to expand the scope of narrower rules. 9
III. THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: PRECEDENTS AND CHANGES
The line of case law designed by the I/A Court H.R. distinguishes itself for setting parameters that facilitate the petitioners to comply with the rule of exhaustion or to be exempted thereof. 10 The few times a claim has been rejected because the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies demonstrates that the I/A Court H.R. has minimized its application. 11 An important factor leading to this trend is that the rule of exhaustion has not been understood as an unbreakable principle, but rather as a guarantee that can be handed down by the States and whose consideration by the I/A Court H.R. is conditioned to some formalities.
International bodies created by the International Human Rights Law have established several conditions that must be met in order for an objection of non-exhaustion to be allowed. For instance, the I/A Court H.R. takes into account the timeliness of its presentation within the procedure before the IACHR, the specificity of the State's claim regarding the existence of a domestic remedy that meets with the effectiveness standard, and the adequacy of proof provided by the defendant State in order to sustain the soundness of its claim. Human Rights. 13 In that case, the I/A Court H.R. considered that the legal actions pursued by the victim in order to remedy an allegedly arbitrary imposition of preventive detention
were not sufficient to comply with the rule of exhaustion, although they could have provided an effective mean to achieve a pretrial release decision.
The victim of that case, José Raúl Díaz Peña, was convicted because of his alleged participation in the protests of "Plaza de Francia" and the bombings occurred in Caracas on February 23, 2003. The criminal proceedings against the petitioner lasted for 4 years and 5 months. 14 The trial, having been conducted before several provisory judges, was contested for not been impartial. 15 Díaz Peña was held in preventive detention throughout the duration of the proceedings and until a definitive judgment was delivered;
12 We can highlight that both, the I/A Court H.R. and the ECHR, apply similar criteria regarding the specificity with which the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies has to be raised by the States, and also concerning the burden of proof to sustain this objection. during this time, the defendant's attorneys presented numerous remedies that were suitable to review the proportionality of the preventive detention. However, the final judgment was not appealed on the merits.
The petition filed before the IACHR claimed that the criminal process was lacking impartiality and that the preventive detention was not proportional; it also denounced inappropriate conditions of detention. This latter issue was the only one on which the I/A Court H.R. delivered a final decision.
Even if it was foreseeable that the claims regarding the procedural irregularities were inadmissible for not having exhausted the final appeal for review against the final judgment, the claims concerning the preventive detention were surprisingly rejected because the I/A Court H.R. accepted the preliminary exception of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by the State of Venezuela.
16
Although the petitioner had exhausted several requests for the review of his preventive detention during the years he was subject to criminal proceedings, the I/A Court H.R. did not analyze the suitability of those remedies. 17 On the contrary, the I/A Court H.R. only noted that the final decision of conviction had not been appealed, and that this would have been a suitable mean to redress procedural irregularities, as well as an effective way to raise his claim against the preventive detention which he considered to be a violation to the right to liberty protected by article 7 of the ACHR.
18
The modification in the criteria to apply the rule of exhaustion was not as evident in the case of Díaz Peña, nor this judgment was as controversial as the decision delivered in the case of Brewer. While the change in the line of case law was barely noticeable on the former, the implications and consequences of this approach are most conspicuous on the latter. 17 Consequently, the I/A Court H.R. used a standard that is even stricter than the criteria applied by the ECHR.
In fact, the ECHR has considered that, when multiples suitable remedies exist, compliance with the rule of exhaustion only requires for the petitioner to pursue all of the vertical instances for one of such means of While analyzing the judgment delivered in the case of Brewer, on the one hand, it stands out that there was a change on the adjective criteria to evaluate the timeliness, In addition to these adjective (or secondary) modifications, the most substantial change was the use of the concept of an "early stage" in domestic proceedings. By using this newly introduced notion, the Court vaguely explained that Mr. Fortunately, the joint dissenting opinion of judges Ferrer and Ventura did offer important remarks to better comprehend the notion of an "early stage." 20 In brief, the dissenting judges explained that the use of the concept of an "early stage" would prevent the Court to determine any violation to the due process that could find a remedy at an ulterior stage of the proceedings. As judges Ferrer and Ventura noted, this would mean that the I/A Court H.R. would rank the severity of violations according to the procedural stages and not the actual impact over the human rights related to the due process of law.
This approach would allow the States to take advantage of an unwarranted delay, as any procedural violation could not contravene the ACHR, while the trial before a national court remains pending.
This description sheds enough light to understand that the I/A Court H.R. created this concept based on the essentially similar notion of a premature case used by the ECHR.
Just as the notion of an "early stage," the ECHR refers to a "premature case" in order to reject claims presented before the last procedural stage that could remedy a grievance.
However, although both concepts may share a similar origin, the manner in which the I/A Court H.R. used the concept of "early stage" differs notably from the way that the ECHR would normally use the "premature case" notion. As a point of comparison, we can exemplify two situations, somewhat similar to the case of Brewer, in which the ECHR rejected a petition for being a premature case:
a. The ECHR has dismissed allegations that challenged a definitive decision within a process, when the decision, in order to materialize a violation, depends on the execution of further acts that could be subject to an independent judicial revision. b. In a similar fashion, the ECHR has considered that a claim that challenges a process because a lack of impartiality at its first instance is inadmissible if the decision could be challenged through an appeal before a superior court that, evidently, will provide that guarantee.
22
These examples illustrate that the concept of a premature case must be linked to the understanding of the judicial process "as a whole," 23 that is, that the Court cannot simply reject a claim because it is on an initial stage, without previously assuring that the further stages will evidently provide the guarantees of a due process of law. The Human Rights
Committee and the I/A Court H.R. have shared these understanding of the process "as a whole" and have applied it consistently through the interpretation of the right to a judicial review. 24 From this perspective, the notion of an "early stage" could be compatible with the IAHRS' precedents if it was understood in the same way as the ECHR comprehends a premature case.
Nonetheless, the extent of the concept, as applied in the case of Brewer, goes far beyond. Its application ignored precedents that would have rose on the necessity of joining the analysis on admissibility with the merits, 25 and ensued an advanced judgment lacking of sufficient analysis on the allegations brought before the Court. analyze if the petitioner was in fact deprived of the due process of law). Furthermore, regarding the exception contained in Article 46.2, section c of the ACHR, it would have been crucial to identify the reason that caused the 3 years delay in deciding the request for annulment filed before the domestic court, and to deliver a decision on whether such a delay was unwarranted or not. 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF AN "EARLY STAGE" IN THE INTER-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
After the decision of the case of Brewer, it is reasonable to expect that defendant states will start using the concept of an "early stage" as a jurisprudential ground to sustain the inadmissibility of petitions filed against them before the IAHRS. Both the IACHR and the I/A Court H.R. will have to decide whether to reiterate the soundness of such an allegation or to reinstate the previous line of case law.
This section will focus on the acceptance of the preliminary exception of the nonexhaustion of domestic remedies regarding the lack of impartiality of prosecutors during the first stage of the criminal trial (that is to say on the inapplicability of Article 46.2, Section b of the ACHR in the case of Brewer). However, it is important to note that these conclusions may also be applicable in other cases where the impartiality is contested against judges during the initial stage of judicial proceedings (which could have also been the case of Mr. Brewer, had he decided to present himself before a Venezuelan Court to continue his trial in detention).
In relation to that claim, according to the I/A Court H.R's judgment, it would have been necessary for the petitioner to be subjected to a trial he deemed to be ab initio lacking of impartiality in order to overcome the obstacle raised by the concept of an "early stage".
In other words, the Court considered that the rule of exhaustion required the deliverance of a final domestic decision in order to eventually appeal a conviction order issued against Prof. Brewer and challenge every procedural irregularity, including the lack of impartiality during the prosecution.
If the bodies of the IAHRS were to incorporate the concept of an "early stage" and decide to apply it in a similar fashion as in the case of Brewer, the principal and most evident consequence would be a significant decrease in the capacity and effectiveness of the IAHRS to protect human rights. Simultaneously, this notion could bring a serious increase in the rigidity and formalism at the stage of admissibility, which would reduce the accessibility to the IAHRS and will cut off its potential impact, depriving both petitioners and States from the opportunity to amend or prevent further human rights violations.
Regarding the accessibility to the IAHRS, the concept of an "early stage" will have two effects. On the one hand, on the normative aspect, it would imply that the exception provided by Article 46.2, Secction b could not rely on allegations related with procedural irregularities whose effects are bound to verification, even if they exist ab initio, 27 but 27 E.g. the necessity to prove the consequences of the claim related to the lack of impartiality of the control judges that, because of their temporariness, were removed at the initial stage of the process followed against 180 rather on reasons that are external to the process. 28 On the other hand, from an empirical perspective, it would require that, in order to raise a claim about an intraprocedural irregularity, the victim would have to yield to the trial that he or she intends to challenge ab initio.
29
Regarding the consequences related with the potential impact of the IAHRS, the formalism imposed by the concept of an "early stage," would hamper the future development of the Inter-American case law and the regional standards for the protection of human rights.
For instance, without prejudging about the claims raised by Professor Brewer, we consider that an analysis on the merits would have brought, at the least, an opportunity for the I/A Court H.R. to make a statement about the lack of impartiality of the judiciary in Venezuela, from the perspective of the accused party in a criminal process before provisionary prosecutors and judges. 30 The case would have also presented a chance to develop the Inter-American standards regarding the institutional guarantees that must be respected in order to preserve the impartiality of prosecutors and assure the existence of a due process of law.
On this matter, in order to provide a less speculative example about the negative 181 Several similarities exist among the procedural standing before the rule of exhaustion during the admissibility analysis of the case of Brewer, and that of the petition filed by Mr.
Tristán Donoso: 31 a) The petitioner had been accused for a crime he deemed to be contrary to his right to freedom from ex post facto laws, and consequently he contended that the criminal proceeding was ab initio affected of nullity.
b) The petition was filed before the IAHRS while the criminal trial was still being processed before the domestic court.
c) The State of Panama did not provide sufficient proof to sustain that the unconcluded domestic criminal proceeding met the adequacy and effectiveness standards in relation to the human rights violations alleged by the petitioner.
d) The State's allegations did not pointed to the existence of any other specific domestic remedy adequate to redress the alleged violations with sufficient specificity.
Were the concept of an "early stage" exist before the filing of Mr. Donoso's petition, his main claim would have been rejected, as the rule of exhaustion would have required him to await until a decision was delivered through an appeal for the review of the final judgment. 
